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Abstract
Pension systems in different countries vary widely in such aspects as the dependence of benefits
on earlier labour income, the minimum permitted retirement age and limits on labour supply after
retirement. This paper uses a simulation model of a rational, utility-maximising household facing
the detailed pension provisions of eight European countries to study microeconomic distortions
induced by the different rules and regulations. We examine in particular the impact on savings,
labour supply, retirement age decisions and welfare.
JEL classification: H55, J26, J65.
I. INTRODUCTION
1. The Basic Approach
Budgetary pressures have obliged a range of countries to consider substantial
reforms in their retirement income policies. For example, Spain and the UK have
implemented large cuts in the actuarial value of future benefits in their state-
sponsored earnings-related pension systems, while the Italian government is
currently endeavouring to push through similar changes. Major reforms have also
been discussed in Eastern Europe (see Hambor (1992), Diamond (1994) and
Perraudin and Pujol (1994)). At such a time of reform, it is important that the
economic implications of different pension rules be clearly understood. Broadly
speaking, three aspects of pension regulation have been studied.
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First, much recent research has been directed at analysing the macroeconomic
implications of pension systems in the presence of an ageing population. Bös and
von Weiszäcker (1989), Marchand and Pestieau (1991) and Hageman and
Nicoletti (1989) describe the problem and apply generational accounting methods,
while Auerbach, Kotlikoff, Hageman and Nicoletti (1989), Cutler, Poterba,
Scheiner and Summers (1990), Chauveau and Loufir (1997) and Kenc and
Perraudin (1997a), among others, use full general equilibrium analyses.
Second, the distributional consequences of different pension system rules have
been extensively studied, particularly in the cases of the UK and the US. Examples
of papers in this literature are Orcutt, Merz and Quinke (1986), Creedy, Disney
and Whitehouse (1993), Hurd and Shoven (1995) and Owen and Joshi (1990).
A third implication of pension rules which has been less extensively researched,
is the distortions that the detailed regulations on contributions and benefits may
induce in microeconomic behaviour.
1 To address this issue, in this paper, we study
the behaviour of a single intertemporally utility-maximising household facing the
detailed rules and regulations of the pension schemes currently in operation in
eight different European countries.
The countries we consider are Germany, France, Italy, the Netherlands, the
United Kingdom, Spain, Finland and Sweden. We examine the effects of these
countries’ pension schemes on (i) labour supply decisions, (ii) retirement date
choices and (iii) savings behaviour. These three aspects of pensions have been
intensively studied in the recent literature but not in an integrated way and not with
our particular focus on international comparisons.
The framework for our analysis is a dynamic programming model of household
decision-making. The household is presumed to choose the time paths of
consumption and leisure subject to the complicated budget constraint implied by
the tax and pension regulations of a series of European countries. Throughout the
analysis, we shall assume that households are fully rational in their choices. While
this is perhaps an extreme assumption,
2 it provides a useful bench-mark.
We simulate our model under the assumption that agents face non-negativity
constraints on household financial wealth. In this aspect, our analysis resembles
that of Hubbard and Judd (1986), who looked at tax distortions in a simulation
model that included borrowing constraints. In our view, the inclusion of borrowing
constraints adds realism to the analysis. For countries such as Spain and Italy, in
which government transfers in later life are very substantial, with reasonable
parameters, it is not possible to obtain sensible figures on savings unless capital
market imperfections are assumed.
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2. Pension System Rules
In comparing different countries’ pension systems, we concentrate on regulations
(i) that restrict retirement dates either directly or by adjusting benefit levels for
early or late retirement, (ii) that require a cessation of labour supply once an agent
has begun to receive state pension benefits and (iii) that link pension benefit levels
to the average labour income obtained in some sub-period of an agent’s earlier
working life. In addition, we analyse the impact (iv) of different accrual factors
linking years of labour-force participation to pension benefit levels and (v) of the
presence or absence of a flat-rate pension.
The different national pension schemes we examine embody combinations of
these various types of regulation.
3 To study their impact on incentives and
behaviour, we conduct a series of six simulations in which, starting from a
baseline equivalent to the German pension system, we successively introduce more
heterogeneity. For each country, the last of our series of simulations shows the full
effect of the national pension scheme in question, while the intermediate
simulations show the implications of particular pension regulations.
Throughout our analysis, we abstract from differences across countries in
labour productivity and preference parameters. This enables us to isolate the
impact of pension system and tax regulations. The regulations we examine may
appear minor aspects of different pension systems but, as we shall demonstrate,
they can have quite large effects on lifetime utility. Basing utility comparisons on
equivalent monetary measures, we find that the distortionary effects of particular
rule changes may easily be several per cent of an agent’s discounted lifetime
endowment.
As a first example, consider the way in which benefit entitlements depend on
labour supply earlier in life. In most countries, state pensions are earnings-related
in that pension entitlements depend on past labour income. Often, benefits are
calculated as a percentage of household earnings averaged over a given period and
then scaled up by subsequent increases in wages or consumer prices.
Contributions, on the other hand, are levied on employers and employees
throughout the household’s working life, just like a labour income tax.
Clearly, pension contributions on their own will tend to discourage household
labour supply, exacerbating the distortion already introduced by income taxes.
During the averaging period, however, the work disincentives attributable to
contributions will be offset by the fact that rational households will anticipate the
marginal increase in discounted future pension benefits that they will receive if
they work more. If the averaging period is short, the impact of this substitution
effect can be very large, leading to substantially negative marginal tax rates during
the averaging period.
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As a second example, state pension rules, applied in many countries, require a
cessation in labour supply before pension benefits may be received. Lazear (1979)
argues
4 that firms may include this feature in their own supplementary pension
schemes as part of an efficient multi-period contract with their employees. Sala-i-
Martin (1992) suggests that public schemes adopt such rules because the presence
of old workers reduces the productivity of the young. In any case, from the
viewpoint of an individual worker, such rules resemble quantity constraints on
labour supply after the beginning of state pension benefits. As one might imagine,
quantity constraints may significantly reduce total welfare.
3. The Limitations of the Analysis
It is important to be aware of the limits of our analysis. First, we suppose that
contribution rates and benefit entitlements are constant throughout the life of the
household whose behaviour we study. This is not realistic in the sense that, in
most countries, agents may reasonably expect that pension arrangements will
change in coming decades. To suppose non-constant contribution rates, however,
introduces arbitrary assumptions into the analysis unless one employs a full
general equilibrium model to ensure consistency. In other work, we have analysed
pension system reform in dynamic, general equilibrium models with overlapping
generations (see Kenc and Perraudin (1997a and 1997b)). It is not possible in a
general equilibrium model to study pension regulations in the detailed way that we
do here, however, and we regard that kind of analysis as complementary to the
more microeconomic approach followed in this paper.
Second, we presume perfect certainty. This is a strong assumption and
probably the greatest weakness of the model employed in this paper. Stock and
Wise (1990) and Lazear and Moore (1988) show that uncertainty tends to induce
later retirement by introducing an option value of delay.
5 Furthermore, uncertainty
regarding length of life may mean that pension schemes significantly affect welfare
levels if annuity markets are less than perfect. Lastly, as stressed by Deaton
(1991), uncertainty and liquidity constraints may interact in that agents may be
willing to save even if they are relatively impatient if they fear possible
deterioration in income and hence binding liquidity constraints.
Third, we suppose that households may be treated as a single agent, and thus
omit the complications of joint labour supply decisions,
6 survivor pensions and
divorce.
7 Fourth, we do not examine the distributional implications of different
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countries’ pension schemes. Fifth and last, we do not separately identify or model
consumption of services from durables or from housing. This is probably not too
serious a restriction in the present context.
4. Structure of the Paper
The paper has the following structure. Section II describes the simulation model
and the parametrisation adopted. The algorithm is based on one employed in
Perraudin and Pujol (1994). Section III sets out broad features of pension
arrangements in eight European countries, focusing particularly on the
heterogeneity of the different schemes and emphasising those aspects that are
likely to have the most substantial impact on households’ economic decisions.
Section IV describes the basic results. The simulations assume basic tax rates
appropriate to different countries and then successively introduce heterogeneity
across countries in more and more aspects of pension systems. Section V
concludes the paper. The Appendix provides brief technical descriptions of the
model and of its numerical solution, plus more information about the sources used
in the parametrisation.
II. THE MODEL
1. The Basic Framework
Our basic framework is the dynamic programming problem of a fully rational
agent planning its consumption, leisure and bequest behaviour over time. A
technical description of the household’s optimisation problem is provided in the
Appendix. Utility is assumed to take a nested Constant Elasticity of Substitution
(CES) form and to be additively separable across time. This allows us to treat
household decision-making as a two-stage process. At the higher level, the
household decides between bequests and full consumption (an aggregate index of
leisure and goods consumption) received each period and discounted by a
subjective discount rate. At a lower level, the household decides between the
components of full consumption, leisure and goods in each period.
Utility is maximised subject to a lifetime budget constraint in which discounted
labour and transfer income plus the discounted value of bequests (received at the
age of 60) is set equal to the discounted cost of expenditure on goods and the
discounted value of bequests conferred (at the time of death). The economic life of
households is assumed to begin at age 20 and we suppose that they die at 80 years
old.
In addition to the wealth constraint, household decisions are limited by non-
negativity constraints on labour supply and on financial wealth. The latter,
referred to as liquidity constraints, are incorporated to add realism to our analysis.
It is clearly difficult in the economies we are studying to borrow in an unsecured
way against future labour and transfer income. In addition, however, we found inFiscal Studies
254
simulating our model that it is difficult to generate plausible savings behaviour
(especially in Spain and Italy, where substantial government transfers are made to
households late in life) unless capital markets are presumed to be imperfect.
Liquidity constraints are therefore needed if the model is to generate sensible
results for all our countries.
2. The Parametrisation
Values for tax and contribution rates are mainly taken from OECD publications.
Details are given in the Appendix. Where possible, we selected parameters
appropriate for production workers, married with two children (a standard
category used by the OECD). We took 1991 to be the base year for our study.
This choice is justified below. Throughout the study, we supposed that utility
function parameters and prices are the same across countries. While preferences
probably do differ systematically across countries, this approach was justified by
our aim of isolating the impact of the pension system and tax parameters.
Choosing our baseline utility function parameters was a matter of educated
guesswork. A summary of all the parameters used in the simulations is provided in
Table 1. In making our selection, we drew on the large number of empirical
studies that estimate utility function parameters. In particular, the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution — the parameter that determines the household’s
willingness to adjust the time path of planned full consumption in response to
changes in interest rates and effective marginal tax rates — has attracted much
interest among researchers. Estimated values are commonly either in a low range
of 0.2 to 0.4 (see Hall (1988): US time-series data, Bayoumi (1990): UK time-





Subjective discount rate d 0.02
Elasticity of intertemporal substitution a 0.80
Consumption–leisure elasticity of substitution r 0.80
Consumption–leisure parameter a 0 0.20
Bequest substitution elasticity m 0.80
Bequest preference parameter a1 1.00
Maximum lifespan (assuming adult life begins at 20) T 80.0
Prices
Real interest rate rt 0.05
Average per-period wage rate w 2.79
Official average wage wav 2.23European Pension Systems
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data) or in a high range of 1.0 to 1.3 (see Lawrance (1991): US panel data and
Mankiw, Rotemberg and Summers (1985): US quarterly time series). We take a
value of 0.8 as an average of these estimated values.
Of the other utility function parameters, we chose a subjective discount rate of
0.02 (see Lawrance (1991) for some justification). We set the consumption–leisure
parameter and the consumption–leisure elasticity of substitution at 0.2 and 0.8
respectively. These combined to yield an uncompensated wage elasticity of labour
supply of 2 per cent, which seems a reasonable figure for the combined labour
supply of a married couple. Such a value may be justified by the various studies
surveyed in Hum and Simpson (1994). See, for instance, Bourguignon and
Magnac (1990). The bequest preference parameter and the bequest substitution
elasticity are hard to establish. Our chosen values of 1.0 and 0.8 respectively
imply reasonable ratios of bequests to peak savings and seem broadly consistent
with the levels estimated by Kotlikoff and Summers (1981).
Finally, at any given date, the wage–age profile we used is hump-shaped in
accordance with the findings of Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992), Davies (1992) and
Gottschalk and Joyce (1992). Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) argue that cross-
sectional productivity peaks at around age 45 and declines thereafter. Productivity
at age 65 is one-third below the peak. Davies (1992) and Gottschalk and Joyce
(1992), both using cross-country data, find that the ratios of mean earnings for 40-
to 49-year-old men to mean earnings for 25- to 29-year-old men are in the range
1.08 to 1.30. In our assumed profile, productivity drops to zero at 65, enforcing
exit from the labour market at that age. Finally, we assume aggregate productivity
growth of 2 per cent. For a given individual, the productivity growth each year is
the sum of (i) growth in the cross-sectional productivity profile described above
and (ii) the 2 per cent aggregate growth.
III. EUROPEAN PENSION SYSTEMS IN 1991
1. Pension System Comparisons
As mentioned above, we took 1991 as our base year. Detailed tax and pension
system data were available on a comparable basis for that year. It might be argued
that using the most up-to-date pension arrangements as the basis for our analysis
would be preferable. However, in the case of Italy, for example, the pension
system has been subject to several major reforms in recent years and further
significant changes are likely in the near future. It is difficult to say even what the
‘current’ Italian system is, therefore. For this reason, we prefer the simple
approach of analysing pension and fiscal systems in Italy and other countries as
they were in the early 1990s.
8
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The pension systems we analyse had some broad similarities but differed
considerably in their detailed provisions. The variation was both quantitative, in
that the basic generosity of the schemes differs substantially, and qualitative, in
that some systems constrain agents’ choices in ways that others do not. An idea of
the scale of different schemes may be obtained from Figure 1. The replacement
rate (i.e. pension benefits as a percentage of final wages) was highest for Spain,
Italy and Sweden and lowest for the Netherlands and the UK. The variation was
substantial, ranging from just over 30 per cent for the Netherlands to 100 per cent
for Spain.
Comparing the upper and lower panels of Figure 1, one may see that the
correlation between replacement rates and contribution levels in the same country
was surprisingly low. For example, total contributions were highest for France
even though the French replacement ratio was less than average. Discrepancies
between the ordering of benefit and contribution rates partly reflected surpluses or
deficits in the pension scheme that were balanced by general tax receipts.
However, it is hard to draw firm conclusions that schemes were in deficit, for
example, since different systems were more or less far from maturity.
The major differences in the regulations of our sample of eight state pension
systems are summarised in Tables 2, 3 and 4. For the purposes of our current
analysis, one may divide the various rules into three categories: first, regulations
about the date of retirement; second, the formula used to calculate benefit
entitlements; and third, contribution rules. Some important aspects of schemes,
FIGURE 1
Costs and Benefits: Eight Pension Systems
Title:  1/2 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 10:18 am
Sources: Replacement rates — Pestieau (1992); contribution rates — OECD (1992).European Pension Systems
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such as benefit rules for spouses and indexation provisions, do not fit neatly into
one of these three categories but we do not focus on these in the current study.Fiscal Studies
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In practice, indexation can play a very important role in pension reform efforts.
In the UK, for example, the adoption of price rather than wage indexation of
lump-sum elements in the pension system means that the nature of the scheme will
change very substantially in coming decades. Modelling indexation in a detailed
way is difficult, however, since its impact on different parts of a pension system
may be complex and subtle (see Creedy, Disney and Whitehouse (1993)). Also,
governments tend to change it quite frequently. For example, in Spain, indexation
was suspended in the period 1983–88, leading to a significant erosion in benefits.
TABLE 2
Tax Parameters in 1991




1. Average employee 10.9 11.0 5.5 15.4 4.9 4.3 1.0 0.0 6.6
2. Marginal employee 18.2 17.1 9.0 26.9 7.6 6.0 2.6 0.0 10.9
3. Average employer 12.9 23.1 20.4 6.1 6.3 20.3 1.4 9.5 12.5
4. Marginal employer 18.2 43.8 50.1 9.1 10.4 30.2 3.6 33.2 24.8
5. Total average (1)+(3) 23.8 34.1 25.9 21.5 11.2 24.6 2.4 9.5 19.1
6. Total marginal (2)+(4) 36.4 60.9 59.1 36.0 18.0 36.2 6.2 33.2 35.8
Supplementary schemes
b
7. Employee 0.0 2.0 5.0 6.5 3.0 0.0 2.1
8. Employer 15.0 3.0 5.0 10.0 3.0 5.0 3.9
Wage tax
c
9. Average rate 8.7 1.0 14.2 32.5 15.4 6.4 21.8 28.0 16.0
10. Marginal rate 17.6 6.7 23.7 47.8 25.0 24.0 37.6 31.2 26.7
Contribution + tax rates
11. Average (5)+(9) 32.5 35.1 40.1 53.0 26.6 31.0 24.2 37.5 35.1
12. Marginal (6)+(10) 54.0 67.6 82.8 83.8 43.0 60.2 43.8 64.4 62.5
Other taxes
13. Savings tax rate
d 39.1 4.5 12.5 42.0 24.0 31.5 10.0 30.0 24.2
14. VAT rate 14.0 18.6 12.6 18.5 17.5 12.0 22.0 25.0 17.5
aMarginal contribution rates are OECD calculations for production worker with two children for the year 1991.
Average social security contributions are defined as the ratio of contributions relative to compensation and are taken
from OECD (1992).
bA negligible percentage of Italian and Spanish pensioners possess private, supplementary pensions so we omit such
pensions in the relevant simulations for these countries.
cOECD calculations for production worker with two children for the year 1991.
dDefined as marginal tax rate on interest income.
Sources: OECD (1991a, 1991b and 1992).European Pension Systems
259
2. Retirement Age
Of the eight countries in our sample, all except the UK and Italy applied the same
retirement age to both men and women. Most countries had a basic retirement age
for men of 65. France and Italy were the exceptions, having standard retirement
ages of 60.
9 If agents chose to retire early or late, in Germany, Finland and
Sweden, their benefits were adjusted for the change in the actuarial value of their
pension. Some other countries, such as the UK, adjusted benefits for late but not
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TABLE 3
Public Pension Schemes in 1991: Germany, France, Italy and the Netherlands
Germany France Italy Netherlands
























Work–pension link No Yes No No
Flat-rate scheme
replacement ratio










Averaging period Career Best 10 years Last 5 years —
Minimum contribution
period
5 3 months 15 —
Contribution period for
full pension
Working life 37.5 40 —
Accrual factor 1.5% 1.75% 2% —
Maximum replacement
ratio
50% 50% 80% —
Indexation Wages Wages Wages Wages
aIn Italy, normal retirement age is being increased by one year for every two over the period 1993–2002 from age
60(55) to age 65(60) for men(women).
bThose retiring early in Italy who have enough contribution years may claim seniority pensions which have
traditionally offered benefits equivalent to the standard pension. This system has provided strong incentives for early
retirement.
Note: Lengths of time are in years unless otherwise stated.
Sources: Foster, 1994; Van den Noord and Herd, 1993.Fiscal Studies
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for early retirement. Italy and the Netherlands, on the other hand, were unusual in
that they made no adjustment to benefit levels for different retirement dates.
An interesting question is why, in many state pension systems, eligibility for a
pension benefit requires that the agent cease supplying labour. Work–pension links
were applied in France, Finland, Spain and the UK, for example. By constraining
agents’ choices, it seems as though such rules are welfare-reducing. Our
simulations below tend to confirm this. One may speculate that governments
introduce such rules in attempts to reduce short-term slack in the labour market or
simply to reduce costs and target those who are incapable of continuing work.
These are not fully satisfactory explanations, however.
TABLE 4
Public Pension Schemes in 1991: the UK, Spain, Finland and Sweden
UK Spain Finland Sweden






























































Accrual factor 0.4% 3% 1.5% 2%
Maximum replacement
ratio
20% (ERP) 100% 60% (ERP) 60% (ERP)
Indexation Prices Wages Wages Wages
aThe normal retirement age for women in the UK is to increase from 60 to 65 over the period 2010–20.
Note: Time is in years unless otherwise stated. ERP and FRP denote earnings-related and fixed-rate pensions
respectively.
Sources: Foster, 1994; Van den Noord and Herd, 1993.European Pension Systems
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3. Benefit Formulas
The most complex aspect of pension schemes we analyse here is the formula used
in calculating pension benefits. In all countries except the Netherlands, state
pension benefits depended on labour income in the period before retirement. The
usual approach consists of designating some portion of an agent’s working life —
for example, the last five years as in Italy, or the entire working career as in
Germany and the UK. Pension benefits are, broadly speaking, proportional to
average wage income in the designated period.
This dependence can generate a complicated profile for effective marginal tax
rates over the life cycle. The discounted value of additional future benefits that an
agent receives if he supplies an extra unit of labour may be thought of as a
negative tax. Such negative taxes depend on how far one is from retirement and on
whether or not the current year is included in the averaging period. The
fluctuations in marginal tax rates that short averaging periods and generous
benefit levels can generate are illustrated in Figure 2.
A crucial parameter for determining the ‘generosity’ of a pension scheme is the
accrual rate. The accrual rate equals the percentage of average wage income in the
averaging period by which pension benefits increase for each additional year of
contributions to the scheme. The variation in accrual rates across countries was
great, ranging from 3 per cent for Spain to 0.4 per cent in the UK. The latter was
so low partly because the UK has a flat-rate pension scheme in addition to its state
earnings-related scheme (SERPS) and partly because the overall level of UK
benefits is very low.
4. Contributions
The contribution rates for pensions are summarised in the upper part of Table 2.
FIGURE 2
Marginal Tax Rates over the Life Cycle
Title:  1/2 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 10:20 amFiscal Studies
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The data given there, which are based on OECD estimates, again show great
variation across countries in both marginal and average rates. The total average
rate was 2.4 per cent in Finland and 11 per cent in the UK, while in France and
Italy, it was 34 per cent and 26 per cent, respectively. In most countries, the larger
part of contributions was levied on employers.
Further information on contributions, including minimum contribution periods
for pension and for full pension eligibility, is given in Tables 3 and 4. Again, there
is wide variation from country to country.
IV. SIMULATIONS
1. Presentation of the Results
We conduct seven different experiments, successively introducing different types
of heterogeneity in national pension schemes. To maintain neutrality as far as the
government budget is concerned, in each simulation we adjust lump-sum taxes so
that the discounted value of the household’s total lifetime tax payments is
constant. Which fiscal variable one chooses to maintain fiscal neutrality is clearly
somewhat arbitrary. We prefer to employ lump-sum taxes (which one may think
of as the personal allowance component of the tax–contribution system in each
country) since this does not introduce an additional distortion (as distortionary
wage taxes, for example, would) and hence leads to results that are slightly easier
to interpret.
We report our results in the form of tables and figures. Table 5 shows goods
and leisure consumption, total savings and preferred retirement ages. The first
three of these four variables are summed over the lifetime of our household (i.e.
the annual levels are totalled to get the numbers in the table). The interest of this
form of presentation is that it gives a rough idea of the macroeconomic impact of a
change in pension rules. If the economy and population were in steady state with
factor prices given from the rest of the world, aggregate consumption, for
example, is just the sum of the consumption of different age cohorts and hence
would correspond to the numbers in the table.
The units of our model are basically determined by the fact that we normalise
the household’s leisure endowment to unity per period. Given that the household’s
economic life is presumed to last 60 years, a leisure consumption sum of, say, 33
indicates that, on average, the household consumes a fraction 
33/60 of its leisure
endowment and supplies 
27/60 in the form of labour. The average per-period wage
rate is 2.79 (see Table 1). Goods consumption is much higher than 2.79%60%
27/60







1 2 3 4 5 6
Goods consumption
Germany 172.2 170.8 172.2 172.2 172.2 172.2
France 173.8 174.4 169.3 167.8 167.6 167.6
Italy 133.4 133.4 133.4 122.5 104.3 104.3
Netherlands 120.2 120.2 120.2 106.2 106.2 105.0
UK 186.3 188.7 188.7 189.0 186.2 185.6
Spain 168.4 168.4 167.2 164.4 123.3 123.3
Finland 187.9 190.5 190.5 189.6 188.8 189.0
Sweden 158.8 156.2 156.2 156.2 155.4 154.6
Leisure consumption
Germany 32.8 32.5 32.8 32.8 32.8 32.8
France 34.8 33.6 37.3 37.2 37.5 37.5
Italy 40.4 40.4 40.4 38.1 33.1 33.1
Netherlands 43.9 43.9 43.9 44.2 44.2 43.5
UK 31.8 31.6 31.6 31.3 32.1 31.9
Spain 33.9 33.9 35.2 34.4 27.9 27.9
Finland 32.6 31.9 31.9 31.6 32.0 32.0
Sweden 36.9 36.4 36.4 36.5 36.6 36.4
Total savings
Germany 308.3 313.1 347.8 347.8 347.8 347.8
France 664.6 608.7 670.8 518.4 576.6 576.6
Italy 554.2 554.2 554.2 257.2 33.3 33.3
Netherlands 276.5 276.5 276.5 378.5 378.5 257.7
UK 559.9 517.7 517.7 484.5 712.2 630.2
Spain 437.7 437.7 461.3 318.9 48.1 48.1
Finland 817.0 743.0 743.0 531.3 779.2 673.7
Sweden 441.4 465.7 465.7 478.9 502.7 409.5
Retirement age
Germany 65 63 63 63 63 63
France 65 60 60 60 60 60
Italy 65 65 65 65 65 65
Netherlands 65 65 65 65 65 65
UK 65 68 68 68 68 68
Spain 65 65 65 65 65 65
Finland 65 68 68 68 68 68
Sweden 65 61 61 60 60 60Fiscal Studies
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aHeterogeneity is introduced successively in 1 (tax rates), 2 (retirement age), 3 (labour supply limits), 4 (averaging
period), 5 (accrual factor) and 6 (flat-rate pension).





2 3 4 5 6
Without liquidity constraint
Germany –0.77 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
France –1.01 –1.39 –2.28 –0.08 0.00
Italy 0.00 0.00 –12.53 –0.40 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 –16.90 0.00 0.00
UK 0.99 0.00 0.02 –0.90 –0.00
Spain 0.00 –0.29 –3.34 –0.51 0.00
Finland 1.07 0.00 –1.03 0.14 0.00
Sweden –1.92 0.00 –2.77 –0.23 –0.00
With liquidity constraint
Germany –1.51 0.76 0.00 0.00 0.00
France –2.13 –0.96 –3.58 1.12 0.00
Italy –0.00 0.00 –5.72 –14.46 0.00
Netherlands 0.00 0.00 –14.06 0.00 –4.57
UK 1.47 0.00 –0.29 1.58 –1.12
Spain 0.00 –0.04 –2.16 –33.11 0.00
Finland 1.02 0.00 –2.25 1.94 –0.56
Sweden –2.78 0.00 –0.50 0.07 –1.82
aHeterogeneity is introduced successively in 1 (tax rates), 2 (retirement age), 3 (labour supply limits), 4 (averaging
period), 5 (accrual factor) and 6 (flat-rate pension).
Note: Figures show the percentage change in total discounted lifetime wealth equivalent to the utility change
induced by the alteration in pension rules. The baseline utility level is that of Simulation 6.
Constraints on space mean that we present summary simulation results for
consumption etc. only for the case with liquidity constraints. As mentioned above,
capital market imperfections are necessary if one is to obtain sensible results for
countries, such as Italy and Spain, where official transfers towards the end of life
are very substantial. Table 6 gives equivalent variation welfare changes for our
various simulations for both models with and without liquidity constraints. Figures
3 to 6 show, for Simulation 6, the paths over the life cycle of consumption, leisure,
savings and taxes paid. These are presented for both the liquidity-constrained and
non-liquidity-constrained cases.
2. Simulation 1: Different Tax Rates
Our simulations begin with a baseline case, denoted Simulation 1, in which the
only difference between countries is their tax and contribution rates. Apart fromEuropean Pension Systems
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the contribution rates and the fact that the retirement age is fixed at 65, the
pension system parameters in this simulation are set to values appropriate to
Germany, our baseline country. The results for Simulation 1 show the importance
of the cross-country variation in tax rates. In the case with liquidity constraints,
total lifetime consumption ranges from 120.2 in the Netherlands to 187.9 in
Finland. Where countries have low consumption, this reflects either high total tax
rates on labour income which discourage labour supply and lead to lower lifetime
income, or high savings tax rates which depress saving, again reducing total
lifetime consumption.
The figures we provide for consumption should not be regarded as predictions
of the observed variation in consumption across the countries. What we are
studying here is differences in the behaviour of a given household when faced with
specific countries’ tax systems. The high actual consumption levels observed in
the Netherlands economy, for example, probably reflect differences in utility
function parameters and initial capital endowments. In the present analysis, we
wish to abstract from such differences so as to isolate the effects of tax and
pension systems.
3. Simulations 2 and 3: Retirement Age Rules
In Simulation 2, we introduce the rules on retirement age and the treatment of
early and late retirement appropriate for each country. As one may see from
Tables 3 and 4, there is considerable variation in retirement ages across countries
if one allows agents to choose their retirement date optimally. In France, the agent
would retire at 60, while in the UK or Finland, he would retire at 65.
10
Two factors influence these choices. First and most obvious, each country has
a standard retirement age, and generally benefit levels are adjusted if agents retire
early or late compared with this age. For example, the French rules encourage
retirement when quite young, and indeed the simulations for France show the
earliest retirement ages.
Second and perhaps less obvious, the level of after-tax wages matters for
retirement age decisions. If one compares Sweden, for example, with Finland and
the UK, the three countries have similar rules on early and late retirement, but in
our simulations for Finland and the UK, our representative agent retires much
later than he would in Sweden. The explanation is that the overall tax burden on
wage income is much greater in Sweden, lowering the incentive to supply
additional labour.
11
In fact, the operation of this effect is quite complex. In our model, we suppose
that, unless a country’s rules specifically prohibit it, agents may continue to
                                                                                                                             
10In our simulations, we took the official Italian retirement age to be 65, the level at which the Italian authorities
intend that it will be by 2002.
11OECD figures suggest the total marginal rate of wage taxes and state pension contributions is 64 per cent in
Sweden compared with 43 per cent in the UK and 44 per cent in Finland — see Table 2.Fiscal Studies
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supply labour after the official retirement when they start to claim pension
benefits. Often, in practice, however, agents receive lower wages if they supply
part-time labour after official retirement as they typically have to change
profession or place of employment.
To capture this productivity fall, we assume that wages drop by 50 per cent
upon retirement. The decline is partially offset by the fact that pension
contributions are not paid on labour income after retirement. Nevertheless, a
decline still occurs and the degree to which it influences the optimal retirement
date will depend on the net wage, i.e. on wage taxes since we assume the agent
receives the same pre-tax wage in different countries.
Now let us turn to Simulation 3. In the baseline country, Germany, there is no
link between retirement and withdrawal from the labour force. In Simulation 3, we
introduce the explicit restrictions on labour supply after retirement that hold in
several countries. Particularly in France, where retirement is quite early, the
welfare effect of obliging recipients of state pension benefits to suspend labour-
force participation is considerable, with welfare losses equivalent to 1.4 per cent
of lifetime income when liquidity constraints do not bind (see Table 6).
4. Simulation 4: Averaging Periods
An important way in which pension systems differ is in the formulas used in
calculating benefits. Most countries link pension entitlements to past labour supply
by making each individual’s pension benefit proportional to his average labour
income in part of his earlier working life. If workers rationally anticipate their
future pension income, such a link between wage income and benefits tends to
encourage labour supply during the averaging period since each additional unit of
labour income boosts both current wage income and future benefits.
The effect of averaging is thus to reduce the effective marginal tax rate in the
averaging period. However, in years outside the averaging period, pension
contributions act like distortionary, dead-weight taxes. Relatively short averaging
periods may, therefore, generate substantial fluctuations in marginal tax rates.
Figure 2 shows total marginal tax rates, including the effects of averaging, for
households in each of the eight countries in our sample. As one may observe, in
countries with short averaging periods, such as Finland, total marginal tax rates
vary greatly over the life cycle. The effects are magnified if a short averaging
period is combined with very generous pension entitlements, as is the case in Italy,
for example, where replacement rates are around 80 per cent while the averaging
period is just five years.
What are the welfare implications of fluctuations in marginal tax rates? A
standard argument in public finance is that, abstracting from differences in price
elasticities, to raise a given government revenue, it is preferable to impose the
same tax rate on a broad basket of commodities rather than to concentrate the tax
burden on a few goods. The intuition is that, since dead-weight losses due to taxesEuropean Pension Systems
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increase with the square of the tax rate, aggregate welfare losses are minimised by
having low rates of tax and a wide tax base.
Big fluctuations in marginal tax rates imply large welfare costs for the simple
reason that they impose a different tax burden on different ‘dated goods’ and hence
fail to satisfy the above argument. As one may see from Figure 2, the fluctuations
in tax rates in countries such as Spain, Italy and Finland are considerable, with tax
rates varying from +24 per cent, +24 per cent and +38 per cent to –87 per cent, –
142 per cent and –25 per cent respectively in the three countries. Countries such
as Germany and the UK, which calculate earnings-related pension entitlements
based on labour income over the whole working life, have far more stable marginal
tax rates.
In Simulation 4, we include the averaging rules and benefit formulas
appropriate to our different countries. Like all our model runs, this simulation is
neutral for the government in that discounted tax payments over the life cycle are
constant. An immediate point to note is the substantial welfare losses associated
with short averaging periods. In the case of Italy, for example, in the absence of
liquidity constraints, welfare is 12.5 per cent lower after the switch from the
baseline approach of career averaging to the Italian practice of using the last five
years (see Table 6).
The main source of these losses may be found in the numbers on total leisure
consumption given in Table 5. The short averaging period reduces total leisure
consumption from 40.4 to 38.1. If one removes the leisure consumption during
retirement (15%1), the decline is from 25.4 to 23.1, i.e. around 10 per cent. Most
of the distortion comes early in life, which tends to magnify the impact on our
equivalent welfare measure.
The Netherlands also shows a major welfare loss between Simulations 3 and 4,
reflecting the fact that state pensions in the Netherlands are purely flat-rate and
thus allow no link between pension benefits and earlier wage income. In
consequence, pension contributions in the Netherlands are entirely distortionary in
that there is no offset for current contributions from anticipated future pension
benefits. The 16.9 per cent welfare loss between Simulations 3 and 4 in the case
without liquidity constraints reflects the cost of moving from the German career-
averaging system to a scheme in which all contributions are distortionary.
It is interesting to note the large differences in the welfare losses in the Italian
and Finnish cases, given that the averaging periods are both very short. The reason
why the welfare losses are so much less in the Finnish case is that the overall level
of marginal tax rates is much lower in Finland than in Italy. Dead-weight losses
are very substantially magnified when one compounds some already high marginal
tax rates with an additional levy, and fluctuations around a high basic level are,
therefore, very costly in welfare. (As an experiment, we carried out a simulation
for the Italian case but with a lower marginal wage tax rate and found that the
welfare losses incurred when the short averaging period is introduced were much
lower.)Fiscal Studies
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Lastly, it is interesting to note that the welfare losses associated with short
averaging periods are greater when capital markets are perfect. Given that the
agents we are examining are far from an undistorted Pareto optimum, the relative
magnitudes of welfare losses with and without liquidity constraints are difficult to
predict. It may be that imposing liquidity constraints has the effect of reducing
price elasticities and hence partially mitigates the impact of short averaging
periods which distort labour supply choices in different periods.
5. Simulations 5 and 6: Accrual Rates
In Simulation 5, we introduce national rather than German accrual rates for
pensions. Up to now, the overall coverage ratios (ratios of pension benefits to
wages just prior to retirement) have been roughly equal for each of the countries in
our sample. For countries with relatively high contributions, surpluses in earlier
simulations were effectively redistributed to households through lump-sum taxes.
FIGURE 3
Life-Cycle Consumption (Simulation 6)
Title:  3/4 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 10:06 am
FIGURE 4
Life-Cycle Leisure (Simulation 6)
Title:  3/4 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 10:13 amEuropean Pension Systems
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Broadly speaking, higher accrual factors translate into lower utility, although
the effects are not very substantial in the case of perfect capital markets. When
borrowing constraints apply, the effects seem to be non-linear in that small
changes in accrual rates lead to positive or negative welfare effects depending
upon the country. However, large increases in accrual rates, which one observes,
for example, in the simulations for Italy and Spain, generate very large welfare
losses when borrowing constraints are binding.
The explanation is simply that high accrual rates imply high coverage ratios
which, in turn, require substantial contributions early in life when households are
typically liquidity-constrained. The effect is to exacerbate the borrowing
constraints, thus lowering welfare. The interaction between transfer policies and
capital market imperfections has perhaps received too little attention, and the
simulations reported here demonstrate the significant welfare costs that may result.
FIGURE 5
Life-Cycle Savings (Simulation 6)
Title:  5/6 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 9:59 am
The welfare losses in the Italian and Spanish cases are so large that they may
be regarded as implausible. Their size, however, should be seen as ‘illustrative’ ofFiscal Studies
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the substantial welfare losses that may result if ‘generous’ pension schemes are
combined with imperfect capital markets. Again, it is important to note that the
main welfare cost of liquidity constraints is felt early in life. Since utility from
period to period is discounted (using the subjective discount factor), the cost in
lifetime utility of liquidity constraints is large. Lastly, note that the desire of
younger households to borrow, and hence the degree to which liquidity constraints
‘bite’ and generate welfare losses, might change if we allowed utility to change
over the life cycle (for example, reflecting family size).
12
In the last simulation, we introduce flat-rate pensions in the four relevant
countries — the Netherlands, the UK, Finland and Sweden. These simulations are
illustrated in Figures 3, 4, 5 and 6, which respectively show goods and leisure
consumption, savings and taxes paid. As one may see from Table 6, welfare and
other variables are completely unaffected when capital markets are perfect. The
reason is that introducing an additional flat-rate pension simply changes the timing
of transfer payments over the life cycle. Our assumption that discounted lifetime
tax payments are held constant between simulations (where the discount factor is
the pre-tax interest rate) is just enough to eliminate any income effects that might
arise from this transfer.
                                                                                                                             
12It is hard to infer from actual behaviour of households what the lifetime weighting of consumption within the
utility function should be, since the observed behaviour includes the influence of capital market imperfections.European Pension Systems
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As with Simulation 5, introducing borrowing constraints changes the picture
considerably in that a flat-rate pension implies significant welfare losses,
especially in the case of the Netherlands, for which the flat-rate pension is
relatively large. Once again, the basic mechanism here is that switching income
from young to old, even when quantities are discounted at the interest rate, tightens
borrowing constraints, raising the implicit shadow interest rate and lowering
welfare.
Our algorithm inclusive of borrowing constraints performed well in all cases
except for Simulation 6 using Italian parameters. In this case, the household was
constrained up to and including the retirement date, which tended to produce
numerical instability. Rather than changing the parameters, we preferred to
perform this particular simulation under the assumption that borrowing constraints
applied until the agent was 55 years old. As one may see from the upper right
FIGURE 6
Life-Cycle Net Taxes (Simulation 6)
Title:  5/6 Kene & Perrandin
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  22/09/97 10:00 amFiscal Studies
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panel in Figure 5, the resulting life-cycle path for savings involves some slight
dissaving just prior to retirement.
V. CONCLUSION
What features of pension systems induce serious microeconomic distortions? This
is an important question, given the reforms in pension systems currently under
consideration in several European countries. In this paper, we gauge the impact on
welfare, labour supply and savings incentives of different aspects of eight
European pension systems. Our main findings are:
1. Constraining households to cease labour supply when they retire may impair
utility by the equivalent of around 1 per cent of lifetime wealth. This may seem
a low figure but the welfare loss for currently old households is much larger as
the distortions are not so heavily discounted in their case.
2. The response of savings to changes in the retirement age is non-linear, with
early retirement in France and late retirement in Finland both being associated
with lower savings.
3. Averaging over short periods leads to major welfare losses, especially in
countries such as Italy in which the overall level of taxes on wage income is so
high. The intuition here is the familiar public finance argument that smoothing
tax rates over time tends to reduce dead-weight losses. Short averaging periods
generate welfare losses since they induce big fluctuations in marginal tax rates.
4. High replacement ratios, such as those observed in Spain and Italy, can reduce
welfare significantly through their interaction with borrowing constraints. By
switching income from liquidity-constrained younger agents to unconstrained
older households, they reduce welfare for Italian and Spanish households by the
equivalent of 14.5 per cent and 33.1 per cent of lifetime income respectively,
according to our calculations. While these figures may seem implausibly high,
they illustrate the very substantial costs that may be imposed by ‘generous’
pension schemes in the presence of imperfect capital markets.
5. Flat-rate pensions may seem an innocuous way of achieving distributional
objectives but they may have quite large welfare effects. If they are financed by
contributions proportional to wage income, they distort choices between labour
supply and leisure. Even if they are financed by lump-sum taxes, they switch
income from young to old people in a way that exacerbates borrowing
constraints.
To summarise, our analysis suggests that a well-designed pension system
should (i) include long averaging periods, (ii) allow labour supply after retirement
and (iii) limit the burden of contributions imposed on younger households, which
may face borrowing constraints, either by limiting the generosity of replacement
ratios or by allowing a fraction of contributions to be voluntary.European Pension Systems
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APPENDIX
1. Technical Description of the Model
In this Appendix, we describe the model we employ and the solution algorithms.
Our deterministic approach with complex rules on tax and pension rules may be
contrasted with recent work by Deaton (1991) and Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes
(1995). One may think of the latter as employing much simpler budget constraints
so that analysis of models with liquidity constraints and uncertainty is feasible.
The household’s utility function may be written as
(1) max
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Here, Ct and Lt respectively denote consumption and leisure in period t, while T is
the household’s lifespan. BT is the household’s bequest in T, equal to savings
accumulated up to that date. The parameters d , a , r , a0 , a1 and m  are
constant. d , a  and r  equal respectively the rate of time preference, the
coefficient of intertemporal substitution and the leisure–consumption substitution
elasticity.
The household we consider maximises the lifetime utility function in equation
(1) subject to the following wealth constraint:
(3)









































where Pt is the price of the consumption good, Wt is bequests received in period t,
wt is the wage rate, Zt is lump-sum transfers, rt is the gross interest rate, t wt , t st ,
tc and t h are tax rates on labour and savings income, consumption goods and
inheritances respectively, all at time t. Here, total labour endowment in each
period is normalised to unity. QT is a price index for ‘full consumption’
(comprising consumption goods and leisure) and equalsFiscal Studies
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We also wished to allow for the possibility that households face constraints on
their borrowing in anticipation of future labour and transfer income. We therefore
suppose that
(5) S t T t ‡ = 0 12 , , , K
where St is private sector financial wealth at period t and equals the first
expression in the budget constraint but summed from 1 to t rather than from 1 to
T.
2. Numerical Solution of the Model
The solution of the household’s optimisation problem is complicated by the
presence of the borrowing constraints. First, consider the case without borrowing
constraints and bequest motive. One may then obtain the optimal paths for the
decision variables by solving the following system of equations:






r a r t
t t t c t U C P





+ = + <
- - -
d a l t
r a r t
t t t t wt r U L w t t    for   
where tr is the date of retirement from the workforce and lt is the marginal utility
of wealth in period t. In each pair of adjacent periods, t and t+1, the marginal
utilities of wealth satisfy the relation l l t t t t st r + + + = + - 1 1 1 1 1 /{ ( )}. In other
words, there is effectively just a single discounted Lagrange multiplier for the
agent’s optimisation problem, associated with the single lifetime wealth constraint.
The last degree of freedom in the problem is then resolved by choosing l1 such
that savings at the end of life are zero. Introducing the bequest motive changes this
terminal condition to
(8) ( ) 1
1
1 + =
- - d a l
m T
T T T B Q
so that the marginal utility of an extra unit of bequests in the final period of life
divided by the price of bequests is equal to the terminal utility of wealth.
The borrowing constraints complicate matters. For each period, an additional
complementary slackness condition must be added to the basic maximisation
problem. As far as the above equations are concerned, these imply that we must
replace lt by l g t t + , where g t  is a Lagrange multiplier that is strictly positiveEuropean Pension Systems
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in periods in which the borrowing constraints bind and otherwise zero. Suppose
one knows in advance in which periods the constraints bind. One may then
compute the optimal path by substituting out consumption in the periods in which
the constraints bind using the borrowing constraints. The extra equations that one
then has can be used to find the values of the additional Lagrange multipliers.
However, the fact that one does not know in advance the periods in which the
borrowing constraints bind complicates the solution. In principle, one may employ
brute-force methods, solving the problem for different combinations of binding
Lagrange multipliers and then taking the solution to be the one that yields the
maximum utility without contravening the constraints. But such methods are not
feasible using conventional computers. The approach taken in the algorithms
employed in this paper is to assume that the constraints bind at the start of the
household’s ‘life’ and then hold continuously until some date at which the
household becomes unconstrained. While this is not a general solution technique, it
works well for commonly observed lifetime wage patterns.
3. Sources for Parametrisation
Tax Rates
Wherever feasible, we employ average and marginal income tax rates for married
couples with two children. Wage income tax rates come from OECD (1991a,
1992 and 1993).
Average and marginal social security contribution rates also come from OECD
(1991a), while marginal rates are taken from OECD (1992 and 1993).
The savings tax rates we employ are for taxes on interest income and are
drawn from OECD (1991b). Finally, VAT rates are taken from the series OECD
Economic Surveys of individual member countries.
Pension Schemes
The treatment of retirement age we assume is based on Foster (1994), while
replacement ratio parameters come from Commission of the European
Communities (1993). We also use Pestieau (1992) and Foster (1994) for the non-
EC countries: Finland and Sweden.
Some aspects of minimum pension provisions come from Van den Noord and
Herd (1993) and Foster (1994). Averaging period details are taken from Foster
(1994), as are contribution periods for full pensions and maximum replacement
ratios. Accrual factors come from Foster (1994) for most countries, supplemented
with information from Van den Noord and Herd (1993) in the cases of Germany
and France. Replacement ratios for unemployment are taken from OECD (1993).
Tables 3 and 4 describe features of the different types of public pension
regimes in the countries in our sample. These include retirement age, whether
benefits are lump-sum payments or other, earnings-related pension elements suchFiscal Studies
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as averaging period, contribution period and accrual factor, maximum replacement
ratio and indexation. Values for parameters describing pension systems across
European countries can be found in Foster (1994) and for EU countries in
EUROSTAT. We take male retirement age as standard retirement age.
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